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FEDERAL RULE 23: A DEVICE FOR AIDING
THE SMALL CLAIMANT
TOM FORD*
After outlining the historical prerequisites for maintaining a
class action, Mr. Ford focuses on the basic policy consider-
ations underlying the class action device. Reasoning that the
basic purpose of the class action is to remedy the grievances
of the small claimant, the author discusses the deficiencies
of the old Rule and the resulting need for amendment.
Through an investigation of recent cases, he concludes that
the courts have been sufficiently flexible in their interpretation
of the amended Rule so as to achieve its basic objectives and
suggests that a less flexible approach would necessitate a
further amendment.
In the brief period since its amendment, effective July 1, 1966,
Federal Rule 23 has dramatically altered the nature and scope of pri-
vate litigation in this country, and it portends further widespread
changes. To date these changes are most noticeable in the securities
and antitrust fields. The sharp upsurge in securities cases is due
largely to the recognition of private rights of action under the Securi-
ties Acts,' to the important investigative efforts of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, and to the Rule's amendment. Similarly, more
and more antitrust indictments are being followed by extensive and
complex class actions under the amended Rule.' In the initial stages
of its efforts, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation' has to a
large extent considered, and made determinations regarding, antitrust
class actions.' The procedures established by the amended Rule should
provide the basis for the most effective mode of antitrust enforcement.
* B. A., Ohio Wesleyan University, 1956; LL.B., Case Western Reserve University
Law School, 1960; formerly with the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice;
Partner in the Law Firm of Calice, Halter, Calfee, Griswold & Sommer, Cleveland, Ohio;
Member, Cleveland, Ohio State, Federal and American Bar Associations.
1
 See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Brown v. Bullock, 294
F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951);
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 71 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
2 See, e.g., Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559 (D. Minn. 1968);
Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452 (E.D. Pa. 1968); see
also Complaint in Philadelphia v. General Host Corp., Civ. No. 68-704 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
3
 This Panel was created pursuant to the terms of the Multidistrict Litigation Act,
enacted April 29, 1968. 28 U.S.C.A. 1407 (Cum. Pocket Part 1968).
4 Reference should be made to the Panel's action regarding antibiotic drugs, pro-
tection devices and equipment, children's books, and plumbing fixtures. 5 Trade Reg.
Rep. n 1[ 50,215-18 (1968).
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I. BACKGROUND OF THE FORMER RULE
In contrast to this significant activity under the Rule as amended,
the long period preceding the amendment was quite calm. The former
Rule was adopted in 1938, and had a long history prior to its imple-
mentation. Courts in England had determined that class actions, which
at an early time had a binding effect on all members of the class, could
be maintained if a common interest existed among the parties, if joinder
were impossible or impracticable, and if the absentee class members
were adequately represented. 5
 This English practice was to a large
extent responsible for the subsequent adoption in this country of Equity
Rule 38.6 Except for purposes of historical perspective, these old
rules have little to do with the present Rule and practice thereunder.
Both were susceptible of differing interpretations, particularly from the
standpoint of binding effect on absentee class members.' Further, these
old rules governed the equity procedure in the federal courts. Their
purpose was to bring a degree of simplicity to equity pleading and prac-
tice, to reduce expenses of litigation, and to prevent delay. 8 Inasmuch
as actions for damages were on the "law side of the court," these rules
were inapplicable to actions of this nature.
A. The Right-Oriented Approach of the Former Rule
The former Rule 23 was supposed to be essentially a restatement
of the practice then existing under Equity Rule 38. 8
 Whether the two
Rules really did coincide, however, is doubtful. But they did share at
least one characteristic—both were subject to confusing interpretation.
Of course, since Rule 2 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure declares
that there is only one form of action, the former Rule was applicable
to all actions whether formerly denominated legal or equitable. The
former Rule was never amended before 1966, 10 although some form
of revision was clearly necessary. The principal source of confusion
under it arose from its tripartite classification according to the nature
of the rights sought to be enforced.' In a true class action, the rights
sought to be enforced were "joint, or common, or secondary." The hy-
brid class action required that rights be several and relating to identifi-
5 3A J. Moore, Federal Practice II 23.02, at 3411-12 (2d ed. 1964); Z. Chaffee,
Some Problems of Equity 202-03 (1950).
226 U.S. 659 (1912).
7 Compare Christopher v. Brusselback, 302 U.S. 500, 505 (1938) (dictum), with
Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 366-67 (1921) (dictum).
8 See Century Distilling Co. v. Continental Distilling Co., 106 F.2d 486 (3d Cir.
1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 662 (1940).
o See Advisory Committee's Note to former Rule 23, 28 U.S.C. App., at 6102 (1964).
10 A few revisions were proposed, notably the one in 1955, but these were never
adopted. See 3A J. Moore, Federal Practice 23.01[4], at 3409 (Supp. 1968).
11 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)-(3), 28 U.S.C. App. at 6101 (1964).
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able property. In the spurious action, the rights sought to be enforced
were several but accompanied by a common question of law or fact
as a basis for common relief. Each of these forms of action was utilized
to some extent in the courts.'2
The right-oriented approach of the former Rule seemed on its face
to be unencumbered with difficulties. Regrettably, this was not the case.
The courts did have considerable difficulty with the true and hybrid
forms of action, but the spurious form of action was especially per-
plexing." To denominate the spurious form as a class action was in itself
completely anomalous. This form was nothing more than a permissive
joinder device." As such, the result in a given spurious action would
have no binding effect on absentee class members. But some courts
permitted these absentee class members to sit back until the conclusion
of the action and then, if the result were favorable to them, permitted
intervention to take advantage of it. This "one-way" intervention was
a major disadvantage of the former Rule." There were other problems
under the former Rule, not the least of which was a disagreement
among the courts as to whether the institution of a spurious action
tolled the statute of limitations for absent class members."
B. Adoption of the Amended Rule
The implications of the amended Rule came as a surprise to many
lawyers. Some were really not familiar with the former Rule because
of its limited application, particularly in the spurious form, and hence
were not fully aware of the impact of the amendment. In recent
months, of course, lawyers have had many opportunities to become
more familiar with the new Rule." Lawyers today in the securities and
12 For a general review of the decisions under subsections (1), (2) and (3) of the
former Rule, see Ford, The History and Development of Old Rule 23 and the Develop-
ment of Amended Rule 23, 32 Antitrust L.J. 254 (1966).
13 See cases cited in Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 23, 39 F.R.D. 98, 99 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Advisory Note].
14 See All American Airways, Inc. v. Elderd, 209 F.2d 247, 248-49 (2d Cir. 1954).
15 See, e.g., Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561, 537-90 (10th
Cir. 1961), petition for cert. dismissed, 371 U.S. 801 (1962).
1 G Statute of limitations tolled: Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 340 F.2d 731
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 816 (1965) ; Mutation Mink Breeders Ass'n v. Lou
Nierenberg Corp., 23 F.R.D. 155, 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (dictum). Not tolled: P.W.
Husserl, Inc. v. Newman, 25 F.R.D. 264, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (dictum) ; Athas v. Day,
161 F. Supp. 916, 919 (D. Cob). 1958).
This statute of limitations matter may continue to be a source of some confusion
under the new Rule. See Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559, 573-76
(D. Minn. 1968), and Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am, Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452,
460-61 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
17
 The Practicing Law Institute, on November 15, 19.58, sponsored an excellent one-
day program on the New Federal Class Action Rule and in connection with this program
it published a handbook on the amended Rule. Many other opportunities for learning
about this new Rule have been available to lawyers.
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antitrust fields recognize the drastically expanding role played by the
class action.
The underlying purposes of the former Rule are not altered by the
amendment. The amendment, however, does seek to clarify the former
Rule and to provide machinery better suited to accomplish its pur-
poses. From the standpoint of clarification, the amendment abolishes
the former Rule's right-oriented approach. No longer is the class action
either true, hybrid or spurious. Instead, the Rule now "describes in
more practical terms the occasions for maintaining class actions.""
The court need no longer be concerned with labels. Rather, its inquiry
is directed toward the appropriateness of the class action device in
given circumstances. From the standpoint of improved machinery, the
amended Rule provides that the result of the action, whether favorable
or not, is binding on each class member, provided that he has not
chosen to be excluded. In addition, the amended Rule permits the court
to take certain steps to assure the fair conduct of the action.
II. UNDERLYING PURPOSES OF THE AMENDED RULE
The purposes of the class action Rule are threefold. First, it seeks
to reduce the burden on the courts which could result from a multi-
plicity of actions." Utilization of the class action device should reduce
repetitive litigation regarding generally related subject matter. It
should be noted, however, that it may yet be too soon to predict
whether the new Rule will in fact reduce multiplicity. For example, a
member of a class included in an action under 23 (b) (3) 20 may never-
theless institute another action at a later date involving the same sub-
ject matter, if he can establish that he failed to receive proper notice
of the action, or if the class representatives failed to represent ad-
equately the absentee class members.' Second, the action seeks to
eliminate the risks to the parties as a result of inconsistent determina-
tions by different courts. Third, the Rule attempts to provide a vehicle
for redressing small injuries to a large number of persons.
The third purpose of the class action Rule is probably the most
important. As explained by Professor Kaplan, Reporter for the Ad-
sory Committee, the "historic mission" of the class action is "taking
care of the smaller guy.""
18 Sec Advisory Note, 39 F.R.D. at 99.
19
 This policy is also reflected in the recently enacted Multidistrict Litigation Act.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1407 (Cum. Pocket Part 1968).
20 In other words, one who is a member of a class described in an action under
that section, and who takes no action to "opt out" as permitted by 23(c) (2).
21 The institution of such subsequent action would be premised on the prior deter-
mination's lack of binding effect because of the absence of necessary due process safe-
guards. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
22 Departing from sound practice, I made an ex parte call to Prof. Ben Kaplan
of Harvard, who, as you know, was the Reporter of the new Rules, and who
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A few years after the former Rule was adopted, Kalven and
Rosenfield, in a now oft-quoted article,23 expressed the view that the
principal function of the class suit should be to seek redress for wrongs
which, although involving only small amounts individually, affected a
great number of people. 24
 To illustrate and to underscore the plight
of the single, isolated, and perhaps unsophisticated person injured,
they observed that:
[t] he employee who is entitled to time and a half for overtime,
the stockholder who has been misled by a false statement in
a prospectus, the rate-payer who has been charged an exces-
sive rate, the depositor in a closed bank, the taxpayer who re-
sists an illegal assessment, or the small business man who has
been the victim of a monopoly in restraint of trade, like the
investor in the reorganization, finds himself inadvertently
holding a small stake in a large controversy. The type of in-
jury which tends to affect simultaneously the interest of many
people is also apt to involve immensely complex facts and in-
tricate law, and redress for it is likely to involve expense
totally disproportionate to any of the individual claims. 25
Recent decisions have recognized the need for a vehicle to redress
properly the grievances of small claimants. In a preliminary ruling in
the well-recognized case of Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp.,' the
in a sense may be the missing Hamlet of this performance, to show cause why
he did what he did about this notice thing. Ben came graciously off the beach
at Martha's Vineyard to take my call, and I should say that I have some doubts
about whether a man who is caught in shorts that way, without his notes,
should be held firmly to everything he says. Nevertheless, with this private
reservation, I did put him the question about this sub-section. He blushed and
stammered a little bit—which is his way, as all of you who know him know—and
then recalled that his committee had indeed thought at some length about how
this notice should work. The reasoning, as he told it to me, relates to the
fundamental conception that I have already touched of classes comprised of
little people, who don't normally have much dealing with lawyers or with legal
formalities. He got to speaking quite professorally—and I wrote down what he
said—of the class action's "historic mission of taking care of the smaller guy."
Frankel, Amended Rule 23 From a Judge's Point of View, 32 Antitrust L.J. 295, 299
(1966).
23 Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, S U. Chi. L.
Rev. 684 (1941).
24 The authors suggested that in a spurious form of action under the former Rule
it would be proper to permit absentee class members to intervene after a judgment
favorable to the class. Id. at 712-13. This suggested procedure was essentially the "one-
way" intervention later adopted by some courts. See case cited note 15 supra.
25 Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 23.
Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 340 F.2d 731 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
816 (1965). Recent proceedings in the litigation have provided new guidelines regarding
liabilities under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77k
(1964), and the basis for establishing the "due diligence" defense. 283 F. Supp. 643
(S.D.N.Y. 1968). See Comment, BarChris and the Securities Acts: Practical Responses
for Attorneys, 10 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 360 (1969).
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court emphasized the role of the former Rule in protecting small
investors:
In our complex modern economic system where a single
harmful act may result in damages to a great many people
there is a particular need for the representative action as a
device for vindicating claims which, taken individually, are
too small to justify legal action but which are of significant
size if taken as a group. In a situation where we depend on
individual initiative, particularly the initiative of lawyers, for
the assertion of rights, there must be a practical method for
combining these small claims, and the representative action
provides that method. The holders of one or two of the de-
bentures involved in the present action could hardly afford to
take the risk of an individual action. The usefulness of the
representative action as a device for the aggregation of small
claims is "persuasive of the necessity of a liberal construc-
tion of ... Rule 23. 727
In Dolgow v. Anderson28
 the court considered the claim by four
purchasers of common stock of Monsanto Company, a New York Stock
Exchange listed company, that Monsanto and its principal officers and
directors had engaged in a scheme to manipulate the stock prices. The
plaintiffs, in addition to seeking rescission, compensatory and punitive
damages of $14,920, sought to represent all purchasers of Monsanto
securities "similarly situated."' The court noted that administrative
remedies, in this case, the sanctions of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, do not obviate the necessity of private group redress."
After reviewing the statements by the Advisory Committee' on the
amended Rule, and the opinions of other courts regarding the purpose
of the Rule, the court concluded:
27 340 F.2d at 733.
28 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
29
 Id. at 479.
3 c)
 The court quoted from the amicus brief filed by the Securities and Exchange
Commission:
Since the enforcement activities of this Commission do not serve to make
whole investors who have been injured by a fraudulent course of business and
since it is economically impracticable in many instances for investors individually
to pursue available remedies, the representative action appears to provide the
most meaningful method by which their claims may be pursued and the Con-
gressional policy favoring such remedies may be vindicated.
Id. at 483-84.
31
 In discussing the factors listed in subsection (b) (3) of the amended Rule,
the Rules Advisory Committee stated: "[T]he amounts at stake for individuals may
be so small that separate suits would be impracticable. The burden that separate suits
would impose on the party opposing the class, or upon the court calendars, may also
fairly be considered." 39 F.R.D. at 104.
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On oral argument in the present case, it was assumed
that, in view of the fact that the costs of the litigation would
far exceed any damages the individual plaintiffs might pos-
sibly recover, if this case does not proceed as a class action,
it is unlikely that it would proceed at all. Thus, to hold that
this action could not proceed as a class action "would . . . be
tantamount to a denial of private relief." 32
No doubt the most significant decision underscoring the purpose
of the Rule is that in the Second Circuit's opinion in Eisen v. Carlisle
& Jacquelin.' Here, Eisen instituted an action against two brokerage
firms dealing in odd-lots seeking damages and injunctive relief on his
behalf and the behalf of all other purchasers and sellers of odd-lots on
the New York Stock Exchange. He charged that these firms had en-
gaged in practices violative of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act,
and had violated certain provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. The district court had dismissed the class action portion of the
suit because of the questioned adequacy of representation, the exten-
sive notice required, and the lack of predominating questions." In
reversing and remanding the proceedings, the Second Circuit stressed
the liberal interpretation which the Rule required. In contrast to the
former Rule, the court pointed out the need for a "flexible remedy." 33
This last, and most important, objective of the Rule is then
quite clear. It is to redress the grievances of small claimants. There
is really nothing new about this objective; it has always been implicit
in the class action device. However, the Equity Rules and the former
Rule did little to further this objective. As Professor Kaplan stressed,
the "smaller guy" normally is not involved with lawyers and legal pro-
ceedings. Not many of such persons would take affirmative action to
intervene in a spurious action under the former Rule. Perhaps recog-
nizing this reluctance to litigate on the part of the "smaller guy," the
drafters of the amended Rule, by obviating in subsection (c) (2) this
need for affirmative action, took a major step in the direction of se-
curing for small claimants a mode for effective compensation. Sub-
section (c) (2) is probably the most dramatic indication that the chief
purpose of the amended Rule is to aid the small claimant.
Individuals today, probably more than they realize, are suffering
from and being damaged by the practices of large corporate bodies.
These practices may often involve violations of securities or antitrust
32 43 F.R.D. at 485.
23 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir, 1968).
34 Id. at 559.
35 Id. at 560. Many authors have indicated that the former Rule was really not
effective, especially from the standpoint of protecting small claimants. See, e.g., Fales,
Significance to the Antitrust Bar of Amended Rule 23, 32 Antitrust L.J. 282, 284 (1966).
507
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
laws or other federal regulatory provisions. How may the small claim-
ant be compensated for these damages? What alternative is there to
the effective use of the class action? Asked thirty years ago these ques-
tions might have been unanswerable. But today Rule 23 exists in an
amended and improved form. Only a conscientious implementation of
the amended Rule will bring effective group redress to small claimants.
As the position of the Securities and Exchange Commission in Dolgow
demonstrates, administrative agencies such as the SEC, the Federal
Trade Commission and others simply do not have the tools available
to remedy the many claims of persons injured. Unless effective use is
made of the Rule the small claimant might just as well be written off;
a better vehicle will not be found to assure him of compensation.
III. INTERPRETATION OF THE RULE AS FURTHERING ITS
BASIC OBJECTIVE
The requirements for maintaining a class action under the amended
Rule are more fully discussed in other portions of this Symposium. No
effort will be made here to examine these requirements. However, a
review of a few of the decisions under the amended Rule sheds some
light on whether these requirements are being interpreted so as to fur-
ther effectively the Rule's most important purpose.
A. The Common Question Requirement
One of the four prerequisites to the maintenance of a class action
is that there be present a common question of law or fact." According
to 23 (b) (3), for a class action to fall under that subsection, the common
questions must predominate over any questions affecting individual
members only. Several decisions on this issue indicate the willingness on
the part of some courts to find a predominance of common questions.
In Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 37 a class action instituted by five
franchisees of Chicken Delight charging violations principally of Sec-
tions 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and Section 3 of the Clayton Act,
the court recognized that there might indeed be differences in the status
of the hundreds of members of the class. However, the court properly
sought the "integral core of the complaint," finding in the action "a
common nucleus of operative facts even though there may be lacking
complete identity." 33
36 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).
37 271 F. Supp. 722 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
38 Id. at 726. This liberal approach is also found in Kronenberg v. Hotel Governor
Clinton, Inc., 41 F.R.D. 42, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), where the court stated:
While there may be different kinds of misrepresentations alleged with respect
to different plaintiffs, including some oral misrepresentations, and while such
factors might have led to a dismissal of a class action under the old rule .. .
the new Rule 23 provides the flexibility to permit this action to proceed.
See also Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968).
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The courts in Harris v. Jones" and in the Dolgow 4° case took
similar views. In Fischer v. Kletz," an action alleging misrepresentation
in the preparation of financial statements in connection with a sale of
stock, the court found a "common course of conduct" noting the cumu-
lative effect (" [']ike standing dominoes") that brings distortion to later
financial statements when they are preceded by ones containing mis-
representations." It noted that there might be variances between the
class members, but that these probably were not material, and, in any
event, that it would be premature to rule on these matters at that stage
of the proceedings:"
B. Adequacy of Representation
In the Eisen case," one of the bases for dismissal of the class
action portion by the lower court was the absence of adequate repre-
sentation." Here the class contained by "rough approximation"
3,750,000 members, all of whom Mr. Eisen sought to represent. The
lower court felt that with a comparatively minuscule and limited in-
terest in odd-lot transactions," he could not adequately represent this
huge class. After reviewing generally the requirements for adequate
representation, the court of appeals criticized the view that "a small
number of claimants cannot adequately represent an entire class . . . ,"
stating:
[W]e fail to understand the utility of this approach. If class
suits could only be maintained in instances where all or a
majority of the class appeared, the usefulness of the procedure
would be severely curtailed...
... If we have to rely on one litigant to assert the rights
of a large class then rely we must. The dismissal of the suit
out of hand for lack of proper representation in a case such
as this is too summary a procedure and cannot be reconciled
with the letter and spirit of the new rule."
In the Dolgow case, the defendants contended that representation
was inadequate because of the "minuscule holdings" of the plaintiffs,
the disparity in numbers between those before the court and those ab-
39 41 F.R.D. 70, 75 (D. Utah 1966).
40 Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 480-82 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
41 41 F.R.D. 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
42 Id. at 381.
43 Id. at 382.
44 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968).
46 Id. at 559. Subsection (a) (4) of the amended Rule requires that "the represen-
tative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class."
46 391 F.2d at 563. See also Knuth v. Erie-Crawford Dairy Cooperative Ass'n,
395 F.2d 420, 428-29 (3d Cir. 1968) ; Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 722,
727-28 (ND. Cal. 1967).
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sent, and the inability of plaintiffs' lawyer to represent such a large
class. In a vigorous response, Judge Weinstein rejected all of these
arguments. He stated that to stress the minuteness of the interests of
the parties in court would be to "ignore the spirit of Rule 23" and
that it "would be anomalous to hold that only major financial interests
can make - use of it."47
 Nor was he impressed by the numerical dis-
parity. At this early state of the proceedings lack of participation by
others would not merit dismissal of the class action portion. Finally, he
completely rejected the arguments regarding the capacity of plain-
tiffs' lawyer to represent so large a class."
C. Superiority of Class Action Device
In actions under the amended Rule, it has become almost cus-
tomary for defendants to contend that the class action device is not
a superior mode of handling the matter." In Siegel and Fischer this
argument was given only brief attention. The courts there generally
noted the absence of any indication that individuals desired to prosecute
their actions alone and stressed the desirability of concentrating the
action in one forum. In Siegel, the court rather summarily dismissed
defendants' arguments along this line:
[I] t would be specious to argue that wholesale joinder would
be either practicable or desirable. Yet that is precisely the
position taken by the defendants when they urge that there
are other more appropriate methods for obtaining adjudica-
tion such as permissive joinder ... or intervention . . . 5°
In considering the superiority of the class action device, courts
have often had dismal specters paraded before them by defendants
with regard to the action's manageability.' The better reasoned de-
cisions, and those in accord with the Rule's purposes, permit the action
47 43 F.R.D. at 495.
48 Id. at 496. The court indicated that the lawyer was admitted to practice in
both state and federal courts, and it was impressed by his "competence and fervor" in
the arguments and briefs which he had presented. Further, the court emphasized that the
lawyer's task "is not more difficult whether he is representing one person or a class of a
million. In either case, he will have to prove the same allegations if he is to prevail."
Id. at 497.
In Fischer v. Metz, 41 F.R.D. 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), the court rejected a suggestion
by defendant that adequacy of representation required that the plaintiffs state precisely
how many persons were in the class. The court said that to "place such a burden on
plaintiffs would seem harsh and unnecessary. In fact, the imposition of such a require-
ment would make the maintenance of class actions in large securities-fraud cases very
difficult, if not impossible...." Id. at 384.
40 Subsection (b) (3) of the amended Rule requires in part that the court find
"that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy."
50
 271 F. Supp. at 725.
DI One of the matters pertinent to the findings to be made by the court under
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to proceed with recognition of the built-in flexibility of the Rule,
which allows appropriate orders to be made at a later stage in the
proceedings.52
D. The Mandatory Notice
The mandatory notice required by subsection (c) (2)" of the Rule
has been troubling to many courts. The mechanics of this notice will
be explored in detail later in this Symposium. It is enough here to
point out that strict adherence to a requirement of actual notice to
all class members would readily render the amended Rule ineffective.
In Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co.54 the court stated:
It is true that the whole concept of a large class-action
might easily be stultified by insistence upon perfection in
actual notice to class-members; and that courts should not be
deterred from Rule 23 economies in litigation by exaggerating
the presumed requirements of due process, or by the specter
of an occasional successful collateral attack on the basis of
due-process. . 55
In Eisen the lower court felt that due process required individual
notice to all class members who could be identified, and because of
"practical financial limitations" of the parties, this notice requirement
could not be met." The Second Circuit in Eisen reversed the ruling of
the district court and called for an evidentiary hearing on this and
other matters. However, it did not rule out the possibility of notice by
publication.° Further in Dolgow, the court emphasized, "In determining
what constitutes 'the best notice practicable under the circumstances,'
it is necessary to remember that the recent amendments were specif-
subsection (b) (3) is "the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a
class action." In School Dist. v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 1001,
1006 (ED. Pa. 1967), the court threw up its hands at the "myriad of complex,
frustrating, needless problems in attempted management."
52 Much of this flexibility is provided by subsections (c) (1), (c) (4) and (d) of
the amended Rule. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 566 (2d Cir. 1968) ;
Zeigler v. Gibraltar Life Ins. Co., 43 F.R.D. 169, 173-74- (D.S.D. 1967) ; Siegel v. Chicken
Delight, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 722, 725 (N.D. Cal. 1967) ; Fischer v. Kletz, 41 F.R.D. 377,
384 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) ; Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673,
683 (N.D. Ind. 1966).
53 "In any class action maintained under subdivision (b) (3), the court shall direct
to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances in-
cluding individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort."
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (2).
54 43 F.R.D. 452 (F.D. Pa. 1968).
55 Id. at 459.
56 Plaintiff argued that mail notice to the entire class would cost approximately
$400,000. 391 F.2d at 568.
67 Notice by publication was allowed to inform an entire class in a taxpayers' suit.
Booth v. General Dynamics Corp., 264 F. Supp. 465 (N.D. III. 1967).
511
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
ically designed to broaden the usefulness of the class action device."'
It recognized that any imposed requirement demanding that the plain-
tiffs furnish immediate actual notice to each class member would spell
a quick end to the litigation.
Many class action defendants today realize their decided ad-
vantage from the plaintiff's inability to give actual notice. In Dolgow,
the defendants vigorously contended that there should be no class
action inasmuch as the plaintiffs could never provide the required
notice. This approach should not be allowed to succeed. The Rule
requires the court to give the "best notice practicable under the cir-
cumstances.”" Certainly due process requirements permit this notice
to be given by publication; this view was forceably stated by Judge
Weinstein in Dolgow s°
The amended Rule may have the necessary force to satisfy the
purposes which have always been inherent in the class action Rule.
But the rigid interpretation of certain provisions of the amended Rule
might produce the same ineffectiveness that plagued the former Rule.
An emphasis on numerical disparity between those represented and
those representing as bearing on adequacy of representation, or a
tendency to view the many problems inherent in any class action as
not being adjustable within the flexible framework of the Rule, or an
unwillingness to recognize the propriety of giving the mandatory
notice by publication could prevent the new Rule from satisfying its
objectives. Probably the statement by Judge Weinstein in Dolgow best
underscores the flexible framework of the Rule, and the practical ap-
proach that must be taken by courts in these actions:
A pragmatic approach is called for in order to overcome
the numerous difficulties that are likely to arise in the course
of a lawsuit of this magnitude. If the trial court assumes a
more active role than it normally does and works closely
with the attorneys, these difficulties should not prove to be
insuperable.'
Unless this practical and flexible approach is followed, the Rule might
just as well not have been amended.
E. Special Problems Involving Class Definition
In addition to the myriad of difficulties inherent in a class action,
one in particular deserves attention here. The courts have yet to con-
58 43 F,R.D. at 497.
69 Nothing in the Rule requires that this notice be given by the plaintiff. At least
one author feels that this notice, including its expense, should be the entire burden of
the plaintiffs. Barton, Notice Requirements Under Rule 23, The New Federal Class
Action Rule (P. L. I. 1968).
60 43 F.R.D. at 500-01.
81 Id. at 481-82.
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front and solve certain problems of discovery. An illustration will
dramatize the problem. It is assumed that five individuals have evi-
dence that certain suppliers over a period of years have fixed the prices
of a product which each of these individuals use. After determining
their possible damages (which for the five total approximately 2500
dollars for the period), and after retaining and consulting with coun-
sel, they institute a class action on behalf of themselves and all other
purchasers of this product. Plaintiffs, of course, feel that there are a
great many members of the class. However, they have no means for
securing the names and addresses of these class members. In a case
where the defendants can supply this information, the major barrier
to the plaintiffs in the definition of the class is whether, and under
what circumstances, the court will permit discovery to secure this data.
On the other hand, it may be supposed that these names and addresses
cannot be furnished by defendants.' How will other members of the
class learn of the pendency of this action? How will the plaintiffs firm
up the class? These questions are not easily answered now; but, for
the amended Rule to be effective in these kinds of class actions, the
courts will have to fashion rules of accommodation."
IV. THE FUNCTION OF THE LAWYER REPRESENTING CLASS ACTION
PLAINTIFFS
The success of Rule 23 is dependent not only upon the "pragmatic
approach" of the courts, but also upon a recognition by the courts of
the function of the lawyer representing class action plaintiffs. Most
small claimants have had little or no contact with lawyers or legal
matters, and will usually have only slight contact with the action after
it is instituted. The plaintiffs' lawyer has the primary responsibility
for securing redress of these small grievances. In this capacity the
lawyer is certainly acting in a semi-public function. As might be ex-
pected, Judge Weinstein in Dolgow recognized this role.
Those who criticize the class action on the grounds that
it stirs up plaintiffs and serves only to provide fees for at-
torneys overlook the fact that we are not dealing with the
traditional lawsuit which concerns primarily those litigants
before the court.
.	 .	 .	 .
Quite obviously, a major incentive to forceful prosecution
62 Perhaps this data cannot be furnished by defendants because they simply do not
maintain or retain this information. Or perhaps the defendants never had access to this
data, as in the case where plaintiffs have not purchased directly from defendants.
63 Perhaps in these circumstances, and after a hearing such as that ordered in
Dokow, a court might permit the plaintiffs, under court supervision, to publish in certain
national newspapers notices announcing that the class action was pending and giving
pertinent information regarding its background.
513
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
is the substantial counsel fee plaintiffs' attorney believes he
may be awarded if he is successful."
V. CONCLUSION
Nothing said above is intended to imply that class action litigation
will be without complex and involved legal and factual questions, nor
that these matters will be easily resolved. What has been emphasized,
however, is that the basic objectives of the Rule, and especially that
objective having a regard for the grievances of the small claimant, de-
mand that the courts adopt a pragmatic approach which utilizes the
Rule's flexible framework.
It is certainly too soon to tell whether the new Rule will achieve
its basic objectives. However, if an adequate period of experience under
the Rule demonstrates that courts are adopting a rigid approach to
the Rule's provisions, particularly those relating to the common ques-
tion, adequacy of representation, superiority and notice, or are failing
to appreciate the many differences between traditional forms of litiga-
tion and actions under Rule 23, one necessary recourse will remain,
namely, the further amendment of the Rule.
64 43 F.R.D. at 487, 495. Any suggestion to the effect that class action litigation
provides plaintiffs' counsel with a means of engaging in client solicitation is simply not
meaningful. In fact, he may be restricted in a number of ways from furthering the
Rule's objectives because of certain strictures which govern his conduct in other kinds
of practice. For example, could plaintiff's counsel, in an effort to firm up the class prior
to any class action determination, properly suggest to the class representatives that they
attempt informally to solicit others interested in the litigation? Probably not. But to
accomplish the basic purposes of the Rule, should not he he permitted to do this?
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